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This paper uses absolute and relative financial poverty lines to explore the differences between the outcomes of the two poverty headcounts and the two poverty profiles.
The differences between the two and their effect on benefit incidence and benefit adequacy are important for policy analysis and policy monitoring and evaluation.
Despite critical theoretical and technical concerns expressed by many scholars, financial poverty indicators still play a very important role in policymaking and evaluation. Most countries use one or several ' official' financial poverty indicators on which progress is regularly monitored and which serve as a basis for many large scale policy interventions. The United States use an absolute poverty indicator that is based on a minimum cost of living threshold which is compared to a families' gross income. 3 The financial poverty indicator as used by the EU member states is based on a relative concept of poverty; the poverty threshold is set at 60 percent of national median income and compared to household' s disposable income. Every year, the annual publication of the official poverty estimates receives considerable attention in the media and public debate in all countries. The issue of financial poverty rates is hotly debated especially when poverty rates increase or when financial poverty among specific groups (e.g. children or elderly) is on the rise. Moreover, national governments use financial poverty headcounts to illustrate the success of their policies or use them as a basis for target setting in the core political arena (e.g. the UK -Blair government on child poverty). The financial poverty headcount figures are also used to guide and implement actual policy. The Orshansky poverty line in the US is for example used as a tool to determine eligibility for programmes or benefits targeted at low income families (e.g. households are eligible for food stamps if their income is below a value of 130% of the poverty line). In the EU member states the poverty indicators are mainly used as a monitoring tool. 4 However, the presence of European funds 5 aimed at socially excluded groups or the development of disadvantaged regions stimulates the use of financial poverty indicators to tap into these funds by using them as solid arguments in funding proposals and project evaluations. suffering from similar and/or distinct problems. It is also a fallacy to think that that more information necessarily leads to improved policy decision making. The relation between policy on the one hand and indicators on the other hand is neither a direct or a straightforward one; other factors than policy influence the indicators, indicators can move in opposite directions over time while some indicators are, by construction, less responsive to policies. It can also be expected that politicians and policymakers abuse a (long) list of indicators simply by being selective and focusing on the subset of the indicators that is favourable to them. Moreover, specific indicators have a tendency to suggest specific policy solutions. Hereby, one may fail to even consider more general or multi-purpose alternatives. 4 A common European social policy is very limited in scope and budget; each member state is responsible for its own social policies and may also use different poverty concepts. However, there are regular meetings between the ministers of social affairs and their employees and each member state is required to define and evaluate its targets in terms of poverty and social inclusion in National Action Plans on Social Inclusion (NAPincl) using the Laeken indicators on poverty and social inclusion (Atkinson, Cantillon, Marlier, & Nolan, 2002; . 5 The European Social Fund (ESF) and the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). 6 For instance, during the second European Round on the size and characteristics of the target group (i.e. the poor). We also study the benefit incidence of various social benefits among the poor and non-poor both defined
by an absolute and a relative poverty line. Are current social transfers successful in 7 Poverty profiles also play an important role in formulating poverty reduction plans now mandatory as basis for donor financing in nearly all developing countries. 8 In this paper we refer to the US official poverty indicator as the 'Orshansky' indicator and to the EU indicator as the 'Laeken' indicator (named after the place where the EU countries agreed upon the use of this common indicator).
lifting people altogether out of poverty, are they beneficial predominantly at the group of 'hard core' poor (i.e. those people being poor using both indicators) or do they equally reach the 'single indicator' poor and non-poor?
We find significant differences between poverty groups defined by Orshansky and
Laeken indicators in terms of size, characteristics, benefit incidence and adequacy.
The differences between groups in a particular year are in some cases already substantial, but the implications of using either an absolute or relative poverty indicator over time could be substantial, especially for fast growing economies such as the new European member states. This also holds for countries with high levels of inequality. From a policy perspective, it would therefore make sense to use a poverty indicator reflecting the costs of attaining some minimum living standard as well as a poverty indicator that identifies those that have considerably fewer resources than what is considered normal or typical in a society.
The next section discusses the differences in the poverty headcount using the two poverty lines for the 16 countries under study. The impact of the choice of the poverty line on the size and the composition of the long term poor is the main issue discussed in the section thereafter. Differences between poverty profiles resulting from the absolute and the relative poverty analyses and their potential impact on social policy as well as the benefit incidence and benefit adequacy form the two larger sections before the conclusion. The appendix explains briefly the technical differences between the US Orshansky poverty count and the EU Laeken poverty estimates.
More or less poverty? Orshansky and Laeken poverty in the EU and US
Laeken and Orshansky poverty measurement methods for the United States and the old EU member states (EU-15) yield considerable differences in terms of poverty incidence (Table 1) Obviously, the first that strikes is that it matters whether one uses the US Orshansky approach or the EU Laeken approach. The degree to which poverty is considered a serious or a modest problem depends on the magnitude of the phenomenon; it makes a difference in the minds of people (including those of policymakers and politicians)
whether the official poverty indicator shows that ' only' 9% of the population is poor as compared to 24% (United States and Luxembourg even below 50%. The use of the same weighting scheme also reduces the heterogeneity in the characteristics of both poverty groups (Notten & Neubourg de, 2007b) . Differences between weighting schemes alter the poverty risk of demographic groups and the household types they live in. If additional children in a household have a lower weight than additional adults (as is the case in the OECD scheme) fewer children are counted as poor as compared to a scheme attributing equal weights. A weighting scheme that attributes higher economies of scale to larger households reduces the poverty risk of such households and its members. Moreover, as the share of large households in the population increases, its effect on poverty rates and risk profiles becomes larger. Given this impact of the US and OECD weighting schemes, we focus on the policy consequences of poverty differences caused by the Laeken and Orshansky poverty lines in the remainder of this paper (using the OECD modified equivalence scales to measure Laeken and Orshansky poverty). The next sections address subsequently the differences between the Orshansky method and the Laeken methodology for analysing long term poverty, poverty profiles, social benefit incidence and social benefit adequacy.
Long term poverty
Compared to other groups in society, the group of long term poor is of special concern because having low income levels for a long time not only implies the lack of an important source to finance current living standards, but also reduces investment opportunities in health, education thereby also reducing prospects of a better future (especially when asset levels are also low). Generally, the long term poverty levels are considerably lower than annual poverty rates. But even when countries have similar poverty rates, their long-term poverty rates may differ. Take for instance Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Finland. The annual Laeken poverty rates in these countries are similar (10-11%), but the long term poverty rates vary from 5.2%
in Denmark to 7.1% in Austria. Or alternatively, countries with similar long term poverty rates such as Luxembourg and France (respectively 8.6% and 8.7%) have different annual poverty rates (12.5% and 15.4%). Exploiting the panel dimensions of the datasets we estimated long term Orshansky and Laeken poverty rates (Table 2 ).
This indicator is also called 'at persistent risk of poverty' rate and labels individuals as long term poor if they are currently poor and also lived in poverty in at least two out of three previous years. To our knowledge, this is the first study that is providing comparable estimates of long term poverty between Europe and the United States. Exploring the changes between 1996 and 2000, it is clear that the changes in the relative indicator were very moderate while the Orshansky indicator showed a decline for all the countries (in some cases e.g. Ireland, spectacularly) except for Greece. It should be noted that the changes in the absolute poverty count are bigger than in the relative poverty estimate, suggesting that quite a lot of the long term poor experienced an income increase lifting them out of absolute poverty in that period but not getting them above the -for most countries -higher relative poverty line. 1 Individual are long term poor or 'at persistent risk of poverty' if they are currently poor and also lived in poverty in at least two out of three previous years. After the poverty status of households in a particular year has been determined, these long term poverty rates are calculated on an individual level only including those individuals in the panel (with a positive longitudinal weight).
2 Percentage of (weighted) individuals being both long term Laeken and Orshansky poor (compared to all long term poor). 3 Long term poverty incidence using Orshansky single adult poverty and modified OECD equivalence scales (which are also used for Laeken poverty). 4 Percentage of (weighted) individuals being both long term Laeken and Orshansky OECD poor (compared to all long term poor). 5 Not available or not calculated. Source: Own calculations ECHP and CNEF-PSID It is of course interesting to study whether the Orshansky poverty estimate would be a good proxy for the long term (at persistent risk of) poverty rate; Orshansky poverty estimates do not require panel data which at persistent risk of poverty do. It would be also interesting to know from a policy perspective to what extent there is an overlap between the poorest in any given year using an absolute poverty measure and the long term poor? A first indication is given in the columns 5 and 10 of Table 2 where it can be seen that the overlap between the two " at persistent risk of poverty" rates is only considerable for 4 countries: France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK.
However, the overlap between the Laeken " at persistent risk of poverty" rate and Orshansky " at persistent risk of poverty" rate does decline considerably over the short period between 1996 and 2000, indicating not much stability. A more direct exploration is provided in Table 3 . We selected a number of ' rich' countries having various degrees of overlap between absolute and relative poverty groups; Netherlands, Ireland, Austria, United Kingdom and the United States. For these countries, the Orshansky poor are a subset of the Laeken poor (Table 3 ). In 2000, the percentage of Laeken poverty is high in the United States and Ireland (well above 20%), low in the Netherlands and Austria (11-12%) and in between for the United Kingdom (17%). The overlap between annual Laeken and Orshansky poverty groups is highest for the Netherlands (88%) and lowest for the United States (47%). In Ireland, slightly less than half of the Laeken poor (about 10% of the total population) have also been long term poor in a relative sense and are currently also poor in an absolute sense. In the other countries this group covers 42% of the Laeken poor in the UK, 33% in Austria and 29% in the Netherlands. The overlap is thus very limited and the Orshansky poverty rate cannot be regarded as a proxy for the long term poor.
The overlapping group, that is to say, the group of people that are both absolute poor and long term poor is, however, very interesting from a policy perspective; not only do these individuals currently have a very low income (insufficient to finance an acceptable minimum living standard), their income levels have been low as compared to the rest of the population over the past years as well. What are the characteristics of the people? From what sources do they derive their income? How did they end up in this situation and what do they think about their situation themselves? The limitation of this paper does not allow us to try to answer this questions but, clearly, such vulnerable groups can only be identified when poverty is measured using both relative and absolute poverty concepts.
Poverty profiles
For designing policies to have a poverty alleviating effect, both the size and characteristics of the poor (poverty profile) are relevant information. Such findings can be used to determine the type of assistance that could be provided to a target
group. An increase in the social minimum pension is an obvious option if a large part of the poor are elderly people. In contrast, when working individuals and the households they live in, are a major share of the poor, other policy options such as tax breaks may be considered. When especially families with children are victim to poverty, family allowances seem to be a serious option. When absolute and relative poverty lines are very different it may well be that the poverty profiles of the two groups of poor differ as well.
To study whether this is actually the case in the EU or the USA, we compare the characteristics of the group of poor who are poor according to both indicators with group of poor who are only poor according to one of the indicators. To avoid unreadable tables we focus on the same subset of ' rich' countries as in Table 3 ; in these countries individuals are either poor regardless of whether a Laeken and Orshansky poverty indicator is used, or only poor when using the Laeken indicator.
Because this means that the Orshansky poverty is consistently lower than the Laeken poverty line, this allows us again (as in Table 3 ), to call the (overlap) group that is poor according to both the Orshansky and the Laeken indicator, the " Orshansky-or absolute poor" and to call the persons belonging to the other (single indicator) group " relative-or Laeken-poor" . We investigate differences in gender, age, household type and main source of income in 2000 and test whether the prevalence of these characteristics differs significantly between both groups using a simple Wald test (taking the specific national sampling design into account). The results are displayed in Table 4 .
Except for the Netherlands, women are disproportionately more often poor than men in all countries. However, the percentage of women being poor both according to the Laeken and Orshansky poverty indicator differs significantly from the percentage of the women that is poor according to the Laeken indicator only in Austria. In that country the percentage of women being " Laeken poor" (68%) is 10 percentage points higher than the female " Orshansky poverty " (58%). The differences between the two groups (" Orshansky poor" and " Laeken poor" ) for the share of men are small and not significant. Looking at different age groups, we find significant differences between both poverty groups (" Orshansky or absolute" and " Laeken or relative" ) for individuals between age 25 and 49 as well as for the elderly (older then 64) in Ireland, Austria and UK. In these countries the percentage of individuals aged 25-49 is lower than average in both poverty groups, but when they are poor they are more likely to be both " absolutely poor" . Older individuals in these countries, on the other hand, are more likely to be only poor when using the (relative) Laeken indicator. Note though, that their overall poverty risk may be high (Ireland and Austria) or low (UK)
comparing their poverty rate with their population share. People aged 50-64 are more likely to be relatively poor in the Netherlands (" Laeken poor" ) rather than absolutely poor (" Orshansky poor" ).
When looking at the type of living arrangements, significant differences between the " Orshansky poor" and the " Laeken poor" are very different according to the country that we study. In the United States, we find significant differences for nearly all types of living arrangements (with significantly higher " absolute poor" among the single adult families and the " other households with children" and lower rates of absolute poor among two-adults families with and without children), while none of the differences between household groups is significant in the UK. Single adults are more likely to be found in the " Orshansky poverty" group in Ireland, contrary to Austria, where they are more likely to appear in the " Laeken poverty" group.
When dividing the population according to their main income source, a more general pattern appears across countries. In the overlapping Laeken and Orshansky poverty group (the " absolute poor" ), the share of individuals living in households where either social assistance, unemployment benefits or other benefits are the main source of income, is larger than among the " relative poor" . On the other hand, individuals living in households with employment related earnings as the main income source are more likely to be present in the " Laeken poor" group in Austria, the Netherlands and the USA. In Ireland and the UK, old age pensions seem to play an important role lifting people above the (lower) Orshansky poverty line but disproportionately less often above the (higher) Laeken poverty line. It is remarkable that individuals living in households where private income is the main source of income are found to be more often in the absolute poor category than in the group of relative poor, although their poverty is much smaller than that of any other income-source group: it seems that most people living on private income are doing very well but those and are not likely to belong to lowest income category.
What is to be learned from this analysis of the differences in the poverty profiles between an analysis based on an absolute (Orshansky) poverty line and one that is based on a relative (Laeken) poverty line? Assuming that we would use the poverty profile only for targeting social policy (and implicitly assume that we would like to target social policy), we can now see which groups in which countries would get more or less attention according to the poverty measurement method that is used. The first conclusion, however, should be that, for targeting purposes the choice of the poverty indicator does not seem to matter terribly for a large number of groups, especially in the Netherlands and the UK where we found a small number of significant differences between the two estimates in this respect. There are, however, differences that would lead to very different policy options depending on whether we base the poverty profile of a country on a relative or an absolute poverty estimate. Adopting the lower absolute headcount would lead to relatively more attention to: -two adult families -tow adult families with children and -wage earners.
As already remarked and accounted for in more detail in Notten and de Neubourg (2007a) , there is, however, a considerable degree of consistency in identifying the groups in the economy that are hardest hit by poverty between estimates based on a absolute and a relative poverty definition. For many of the breakdowns the choice of the poverty measurement method would have no influence on the group that experienced the highest poverty rate.
Nevertheless, we find that in quite some cases the poverty risk for a particular group is more or less pronounced when using either a Laeken or an Orshansky poverty line.
The pension system seems to be another underlying factor contributing in many inconsistencies in poverty risk; inconsistencies between both poverty indicators occur more often with elderly age groups and households whose main source of income is a pension. It should, also, not be forgotten that absolute and relative poverty lines show diverging developments over time and that the resulting poverty trends may thus be opposing or diverging. Over a decade, the underlying composition of both poverty groups may change considerably, especially in fast growing economies or countries experiencing substantial social and demographic changes or structural reforms. For these cases it still would matter a lot whether a relative or an absolute poverty line is chosen as a basis for targeting social and economic policy. 
5.

Social transfer incidence and adequacy
The tax and social transfer systems in Europe and the USA are complex systems that redistribute funds from rich to poor, from working age adults to the young and the elderly and from workers to non-workers. In doing so, they affect the shape of the (disposable) income distribution and thus also influence absolute and relative poverty rates. If one excludes social transfers from household income, Laeken poverty rates would be 35% in the Netherlands and Ireland, 38% in Austria, 39% in the United Kingdom and 33% in the United States. Orshansky poverty would be somewhat lower varying from 32% in the United Kingdom to 19% in the United States (Notten & Neubourg de, 2007a) .
11 These numbers reflect the joint impact of the complete social transfer system. The data and the estimates we have made allow us to study the impact of transfers separately. Whether social transfers are targeted at low income groups and whether a particular type of transfer contributes to lifting people out of absolute (Orshansky) poverty but not out of relative (Laeken) poverty or is it successful in terms of both indicators, are questions that will be addressed in the rest of this section. We evaluate how various types of social transfers affect the poor and non-poor population, again dividing the poor population into the absolute (Orshansky) poor and the relative (Laeken) poor and contrast the presence of social transfers for these groups with transfers to non-poor population. More specifically, we investigate to 11 Orshansky poverty rates calculated using the United States implied equivalence scales. what extent both poverty groups are covered by the social transfer system by looking at incidence rates (whether a person is actually receiving social transfers) and mean value (adequacy of social transfers). We examine three 12 types of transfers: old age pensions (private and public), family allowances and social assistance. For the United
States we have only two transfer types; pensions (social security pensions 13 and private retirement income) and other social transfers (including temporary assistance to needy families and food stamps). Table 5 lists the benefit incidence of five social transfer categories in the same five countries that we studied in the previous sections. The incidence rates reflect the percentage of individuals living in households that reported receiving a particular benefit. Although pensions, family allowances and other social insurance benefits are common transfers in all countries, the incidence of these transfers clearly differs by country. The incidence of pensions varies from 23% in the US to 36% in Austria, while family benefits have the highest incidence rates in the European countries varying from 47% in the Netherlands to 65% in Ireland. The lower incidence of nonpension social transfers in the United States can partly be explained by the fact that we ignore ' transfers' through the tax system such as tax breaks and tax credits.
14 Difference between the countries is not always a reflection of differences in policies but can also be influenced by basic demographic and economic differences: e.g. the incidence of old age pensions is clearly related to the share of elderly in the economy.
The classification of the transfer categories suggests which type of risk is being covered; old age pensions cover the risk of no or low income at old age while other social insurance transfers insure the retention of some income in the event of illness, disability or unemployment. Family allowances financially support parents with the upbringing of their children and social assistance helps households that have no or a very low income. This, however, does not mean that the prevention of that risk is the 12 Except for the figures in Table 5 and Table 6 , we do report the results for two other types of benefits that we studied -other social insurance benefits (unemployment, sickness and disability) and other benefits (housing allowance, education allowance and other stipends). impact on the level of economic well-being of the individual and its household. In this paper we focus on evaluating the impact of these transfers on the partially overlapping absolute and relative poverty groups as compared to the rest of the population. This may, or may not, correspond with the actual objectives of these policies in the studied countries. Table 6 shows a decomposition of the benefit incidence for 3 different groups: the " absolute (Orshansky) poor" , the " relative (Laeken) poor" 15 and the nonpoor in 2000. A first observation is that incidence levels vary considerably between these population groups but not necessarily systematically across countries. We discuss each transfer category in turn (patterns in " other social transfers" in the United
States are discussed under social assistance benefits).
Pensions
In the Netherlands, receipt of old age pensions in both poverty groups is significantly lower than for the non-poor group. In Ireland and the United Kingdom, pension incidence in the Laeken and Orshansky poverty group is similar to that in the nonpoor group while it is much higher in the Laeken only group. There are no significant differences between the population groups in the United States while in Austria the pension incidence is higher in both poverty groups. Thus, depending on the country, receipt of pensions is associated with a lower poverty risk (Netherlands), an increased poverty risk (Austria), with a higher risk for those in relative -Laeken only -poverty (Ireland and United Kingdom) or an average poverty risk (United States). Persons with a long contribution record and/or high income during working life have acquired more pension rights and are thus receiving a higher pension. Another factor influencing incidence patterns is that pension recipients may be part of a household that also includes non-elderly persons. The indicator of pension incidence used in this paper counts all individuals living in the household receiving a pension, not just those individuals that are eligible. Even though an elderly person's pension may be sufficient to lift that person out of poverty, the pension and other income sources may fall short when all individuals of the household are taken into account (or vice versa). These explanations are consistent with the distributional patterns observed in Figure 1 and Figure 2 In Austria and Ireland the highest incidence rates are covering the area of the Laeken and Orshansky poverty lines. By determining who is eligible for how much benefit, social transfer systems also exercise influence on the prevalence of particular individual and household level characteristics along the income distribution. For instance, the peaks in pension incidence also provide some information about the characteristics of the individuals in that area of the income distribution; a high incidence of pension benefits typically also indicates a higher prevalence of elderly persons. In the Netherlands, the 27 share of elderly persons in both poverty groups is well below their average population share (Table 4) . However, it need not be the case that high rates of pension incidence beyond the poverty line also imply that elderly persons also have a lower than average poverty risk. Take for instance the US, where there are no significant differences in the incidence of pensions across the income distribution and where the age group 65 and above comprises 12% of the total population; the population shares of the poor pension aged individuals are well above their average population share (22% for the " Orshansky poverty group" and 35% for the " Laeken poverty group" ). 
Family allowances
The incidence of family allowances is very high in the four European countries that we consider. While there are some significant difference between either of the poverty groups and the non poor population (Netherlands and UK); there are no significant differences between the incidence rates both poverty groups. Figure 3 and Figure 4 indeed show that benefit incidence is rather constant across income levels, although some local ' peaks' can be identified. The pattern is also relatively constant in terms of mean benefit value. Clearly, benefit levels are well below the adult equivalent level and one third of this level (the equivalence weight of a child under age 14). The mean values of family allowance received seem to be somewhat higher at income levels in the middle of the figures as compared to very low and ' near' median incomes; this is especially clear in the case of the United Kingdom. These peaks may indicate a higher presence of households with one or more children. Family allowances in each of these countries are universal and vary by country as well as by the number of dependent children (International Social Security Association, 2002) . Only in Ireland low income families and single parents are eligible for an additional income tested allowance. In the UK there is an income depended tax credit (the value of this credit is not included in the mean transfer amounts). The prevention of child poverty, either in an absolute or relative sense, is not the main objective of these allowances.
Social assistance benefits
Social assistance benefits are typically provided to low income households. Often an income or means test is accompanied by other criteria (i.e. having children, job search or willingness to work). 16 We include the 'Other social transfer category' from the US under this heading as two of the main low income support programmes are included in these transfers (food stamps and temporary assistance to needy families). In some countries such assistance is limited to a certain time period (US) while in other benefits may be 16 For details about the European systems of social assistance see .
received over a prolonged period (Netherlands). 17 Incidence levels vary considerably between countries ranging from 42-46% of the Laeken and Orshansky poor individuals in
Ireland and the US to 2% in the same poverty group in Austria. In the European countries significant differences in incidence levels can only be found between the poor and non poor population groups while in the US the benefit incidence level vary significantly between all population groups. These patterns are confirmed in the distributional plots;
especially in Ireland and the US incidence levels show a steep decline as income levels increase. Such patterns correspond to slow phasing out of income support, in order to prevent the creation of a poverty trap. However, the plots of mean benefit values show that the level of benefits does not vary greatly by income levels. If a phasing out of benefit would be applied, it can be expected such income tested benefits would be higher at lower income levels, but for Ireland, Austria and the US benefits are rather constant and for the Netherlands the mean benefit value increases as income increases. In the case of Ireland and the US, benefits are clearly means-tested but generosity is not higher for the worst off. The pattern in the Netherlands does not correspond with formal eligibility rules; even though in some cases recipients are allowed to some other earnings these are not large amounts. 18 There exist two possible (non-exclusive) explanations. Firstly, part of reported income may not be formal and are thus also not reported to the benefit agency. Secondly, part of other income is also derived from other income tested transfers such as housing allowance or income tested study grants for studying children. 19 A general observation is that these benefits, by themselves, are insufficient to lift people out of absolute or relative poverty. However, with this type of benefits it is probably more appropriate to look at shorter spells than annual figures as the typical spell of benefit receipt may be shorter than a year. 
6.
Absolute and relative poverty concepts and policy: discussion
Using absolute Orshansky and relative Laeken poverty indicators on data from the EU member states (EU-15) and the USA showed significant differences between these partially overlapping groups of poor. We found not only differences between the size of absolute and relative poverty groups but also significant variations in terms of characteristics and we also showed how such differences would influence the selection of priority groups based on each poverty indicator. Moreover, this variation is not necessarily systematic across countries or across time. We further discussed how various types of social transfers affect absolute and relative poverty groups differently (in terms of benefit incidence and benefit level). In this concluding section we discuss the relevance of monitoring absolute and relative poverty indicators from a conceptual perspective.
Absolute and relative poverty indicators reflect related, but conceptually distinct, approaches to determining insufficient levels of well-being. They are related because absolute or relative concepts of poverty may be applied to the same welfare dimension (i.e. economic well-being) and measured by the same welfare indicator (i.e. income, expenditures or assets). They are conceptually distinct because the benchmark used to determine the cut-off separating well-being from ill-being either depends on the distribution of this welfare indicator (relative) or on some assessment of what constitutes a minimum achievement, basic need or right (absolute). This difference in approach has important implications. Take for instance a country or region where large parts of the population are facing an ongoing struggle to satisfy their basic needs in terms of food and shelter. If having just one or two sober meals a day is common in this society, absolute poverty exceeds relative poverty. Imagine that the 50 th percentile person in that society has two meals a day wile there is also a smaller group of persons having only one meal.
Taking an internationally accepted standard of minimum food requirements or calorie intake as a benchmark, absolute (food) poverty rates may be well above 50% of the population. If, instead, one would use a relative poverty line where the middle person is taken as the benchmark, it is likely that only the persons having a single meal a day would be considered poor. The opposite situation may hold for a country in which the 34 living standard is generally higher and perhaps some resources are being redistributed from the better off to the less well off; in such a country absolute poverty levels could be similar to relative poverty levels or considerably lower.
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' Not having enough to satisfy basic or main needs' or ' having much less than what is considered typical or normal in a given society' are distinct concepts of ill-being and their indicators may yield very different outcomes, especially over time. From a national policy perspective, it is therefore relevant to monitor both poverty concepts. Take for instance a steadily growing economy where the benefits from growth are equally distributed over the population; if one would only measure relative poverty one would ' miss' the fact that increasingly large parts of the population are able to afford a minimum basket of goods. If, instead, growth in this economy is unevenly distributed but nonetheless positive, a decrease in absolute poverty may be accompanied by increasing relative poverty. The groups of absolute and relative poor in a country partly overlap, but the degree of overlap changes over time. Thus, when designing or evaluating a policy, it makes sense to consider the potential impact that these policies may have on the absolute and relative poor. For the 'richer' countries (where absolute poverty is typically lower than relative poverty) a condition may be that only policies having a positive effect on absolute poverty reduction and a neutral effect on relative poverty will be given the consideration of actually being implemented. This is not to say that one should ignore other distributional effects, but from an equity perspective one might care more about those people having much less than what is considered minimal than those that have more.
Over time, the underlying composition of both poverty groups may change considerably, especially in fast growing economies or countries experiencing substantial social and demographic changes or structural reforms. As long as lower incomes profit at least a little from economic growth in real terms, absolute poverty will typically decline. Trends in relative poverty rates depend on the distributional implications of economic growth, social and demographic change and government policies in a particular country; these factors not only affect the number of people living below the poverty line (i.e. changes in the shape of the income distribution at its lower end) but also affect the determination of the relative poverty line itself (i.e. changes in the middle section of the income distribution). Changes in overall poverty trends can thus mask larger (and opposing) welfare changes between socio-economic groups. For instance, if (minimum) pensions are annually adjusted for inflation while wages increase in tandem with real economic growth; working households experience an increase in purchasing power while pensioner households do not. Moreover, as working households are often also found in the middle of the income distribution, the relative poverty line rises with the real wage increase of the median household. As a result, absolute poverty under pensioners remains equal while absolute poverty under working households declines. However, relative poverty among pensioners will rise while it may or may not remain constant among working households. This is certainly relevant for the new EU member states but the distributional impact of ageing societies in the US and ' old' EU member states should also not be underestimated.
The Laeken indicators as used by the European Union do not inform us to what extent the extent the Italian or Dutch population has the resources to finance a minimum basket of goods. 21 They only tell us that only 8% of the population in the Czech Republic is having an income that is lower than 60% of the income of the ' median' Czech (the Czech Republic has the lowest relative poverty level in the EU). 22 Or take a country like Romania, with a relative poverty of 17% in 2000; it is very likely that an absolute poverty 21 The Laeken indicators also include a relative poverty indicator which is 'anchored at a moment in time' (Atkinson et al., 2002) . This means that the relative poverty line for a given year is updated to subsequent year using the rate of inflation. However, the anchoring of a relative poverty line over time is not an alternative for a minimum living standard indicator because the initial level of the poverty line is based on the income distribution and not on the costs of satisfying basic needs. 36 rate based on the minimum cost of living lies well above the current relative poverty rate.
It is however, expected that the Romanian economy will continue to grow considerably, thereby reducing absolute poverty rates. Depending on how the benefits of this growth will be distributed across the population, relative poverty will increase, decline or remain constant. In the United States there is an ongoing debate over the problems associated with the Orshansky poverty indicator. As a result of this general dissatisfaction, the Bureau of Census also publishes alternative poverty statistics computed using various income definitions and another absolute poverty line which better reflects the current costs of basic needs but a relative poverty indicator is not part of such analyses (US Census Bureau, June 2005). Absolute and relative poverty statistics enable the identification and monitoring of distinct but partially overlapping groups. Each group reflects a vulnerable group in society and should be given special consideration. It therefore makes absolutely (!) sense to monitor progress using both relative and absolute poverty indicators.
